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RULE 43(a) AND THE COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGED UNDER
STATE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF CONFUSION
GEORGE W. PUGH*
What rules govern the admissibility of evidence in federal court?
Rule 43 (a) purports to provide the answer with respect to cases
falling within the ambit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
Is the Rule working satisfactorily, or should it now be abandoned
in favor of a new and different solution?
The problem thus presented is broad and pervasive.2 A definitive
answer will not be attempted in this paper. Instead, the writer pro-
poses to give only a general discussion of the broader aspects of the
Rule, and to limit analysis of the cases to a very restricted area-
the meaning and application of the Rule with respect to the com-
munication privileged under state law. Perhaps this tree approach
to the forest of Rule 43(a) will sharpen analysis of the broader
problem.
Rule 43(a) 3 makes reference to three separate bodies of law: (1)
"the statutes of the United States," (2) "the rules of evidence hereto-
fore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits
in equity," and (3) "the rules of evidence applied in the courts of
general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court
* Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Re-
search Consultant, Louisiana Code of Practice Revision, Louisiana State Law
Institute.
The writer is much indebted to Mr. Tom Frisby, senior law student at
Louisiana State University, for very valuable research assistance.
1. As to the scope and applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, see Rules 1 and 81 thereof. See also the discussion in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE c.1 (2d ed. 1948) passim.
For other provisions in the Rules bearing upon evidence, see 5 MoonE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 43.02[3] (2d ed. 1951).
2. For general discussions of Rule 43(a), see: 5 MoonE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
c.43 (2d ed. 1951) passim; Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 622 (1936), 47 Yale L.J. 194
(1937); Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55
ILuAv. L. REv. 197 (1941); Green, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAND.
L. REv. 560 (1952); Conrad, Lets Weigh Rule 43(a), 38 VA. L. REV. 985 (1952);
Note, Federal Rule 43(A)-A Decadent Decade, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1948);
Note, The Admissibility of Evidence in Federal Courts under Rule 43(a),
46 COL. L. REv. 267 (1946).
3. "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open
court, unless otherwise provided-by these rules. All evidence shall be admitted
which is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules
of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing
of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of
general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is held. In
any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs
and the evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient method
prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein made.
The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner."
FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (a).
RULE 43(a)
is held." If the evidence would be admissible under any one of these
systems, then under Rule 43(a) it is admissible. And "[t]he com-
petency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner."
The seeming simplicity of the approach is deceptive. But before
discussing the difficulties inherent in the Rule, let us examine the
reasons which prompted the approach.
GENERAL BACKGROUND OF RULE 43(a)
Confusion characterized the system in force prior to 1938. 4 In 1936
Dean Wigmore stated in an article 5 appearing in the American Bar
Association Journal:
"The truth is-though some of you may regard this statement as an
exaggeration-that the law of evidence in our Federal Courts is in a
most deplorable condition. It is inferior to that of any of the fifty States
and Territories-I say, inferior to any of them, and not only inferior but
far inferior."6
And Dean (now Judge) Dobie considered the federal system of
evidence a "veritable hodgepodge."7 It is unnecessary to describe
that confusion here. Suffice it to say that such studies do exist8 and
the point is amply established.
That reform was needed was obvious. But could it be accomplished
through the medium of the Federal Rules?
There was serious doubt 9 as to whether the Rule Making Statute 0
authorized the Court to promulgate rules of evidence. That act had
stipulated that "said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify
the substantive rights of any litigant."" Were rules of evidence to
be considered substantive within the meaning of the statute? The
Rules of Decisions Act 12 had always been considered as regulating
4. See MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.04[11] (2d ed. 1948); 1 WiGmoRE, EvI-
DENCE § 6 (3d ed. 1940); and Callahan and Ferguson, supra note 2, and 47
YALE L.J. 194 (1937).
5. Wigmore, A Critique of the Federal Court Rules Draft-Three Larger
Aspects of the Work Which Require Further Consideration, 22 A.B.A.J. 811
(1936).
6. Id. at 813.
7. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JuRIsDICTION AND PRocEDu E 623 (1928).
8. See 1 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 6 (3d ed. 1940); and Callahan and Ferguson,
Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 622
(1936).
9. See Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the United States Supreme
Court, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1934). See also the discussion in 5 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 43.02[2] (2d ed. 1951); and note, Federal Rule 43(A)-A
Decadent Decade, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 240 (1948).
10. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), now substantially embodied in 28 U.S.C.A. §
2072 (Supp. 1953).
11. Ibid. (Italics supplied)




substance and not procedure,13 and most (though not all) regarded
evidence as falling within its purview. 14 There was other indication,
however, that evidence should be considered as procedural.'5 The
matter was called to the attention of the Supreme Court by Chairman
Mitchell,'6 but the Rule was nevertheless adopted. This fact alone
affords ample testimony that the Court believed Congressional author-
ization to be present. Be this as it may, the existence of contemporary
doubts may well have influenced the Committee in limiting the extent
of evidentiary reform.' 7 There was another important element, how-
ever. The Committee did not consider the formulation of rules of
evidence to be its primary function. Indeed the Committee's first
impression was that it should not touch upon the rules of evidence.
18
They later found, however, that the union of law and equity neces-
sitated some clarification of evidentiary rules.1 To embark upon the
formulation of a code of evidence would have consumed an enormous
13. See 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 43.02[2] (2d ed. 1951).
14. Ibid.
15. See 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 43.02[2] (2d ed. 1951), wherein Pro-
fessor Moore points out that some prior Supreme Court decisions had indi-
cated evidence to be procedural [citing Dravo v. Fabel, 132 U.S. 487, 10 Sup.
Ct. 170, 33 L. Ed. 421 (1889), and Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18
Sup. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204 (1898)]; that state practice treated evidence as
procedure [citing 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597.1 (1953)]; and that a
similar treatment of evidence is made by the American Law Institute [citing
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 585, 595-98 (1934)]. See also the discus-
sion by Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 622, 641-44 (1936).
16. In the letter to Chief Justice Hughes accompanying the third draft of
the Rules, Chairman Mitchell stated: "There is some difference of opinion in
the Committee as to the extent to which the statute authorizes the Court to
make rules dealing wih evidence. We have touched the subject as lightly
as possible. We felt it quite essential to go this far. We have preserved the
present system in patent and trademark cases, with uniformity of procedure
in law and equity actions. Members of the bar have been considerably troubled
as to what the rules of evidence would be. Our Rule 50 [which developed into
the present Rule 43] is intended only to close the gap and prevent confusion
and doubt." PRELIMINARY DRAFT or RULES or CiviL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS or THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT oF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Foreword, p. xvii (1936).
See also the discussion in Note, Federal Rule 43(A)-A Decadent Decade,
34 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 240 (1948); and in 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 43.02[2]
(2d ed. 1951).
-17. See Note, Federal Rule 43(A)-A Decadent Decade, 34 CORNELL L.Q.
238, 240 (1948).
18. In a note to the Supreme Court, the Committee had stated in 1937:
"The first impression of the Committee was against touching the field of
evidence. It later became clear that on account of the union of law and
equity there would be doubt as to the rules of evidence to be applied. We
think it essential to deal with the subject at least to the extent expressed
in subdivision (a) of this rule [Rule 44 at that time, present Rule 43]. Hav-
ing gone that far the Committee made the further provisions in subdivision
(b) of this rule and summarized in Rule 45 [present Rule 44] the law on proof
of official records now scattered through many Federal statutes." Committee
Note to Rule 44 of April 1937 Draft, as quoted in 5 MooRs, FEDERAL PRACTICE




amount of time,20 and would therefore necessarily have delayed the
adoption of the balance of the Rules. In addition, extensive revision
of the rules of evidence would probably have engendered some
opposition, which might have spilled over to the rest of the Rules. 1
It is quite understandable, therefore, that only stop-gap measures
were adopted. It is less understandable why subsequent reforms have
not been made. That Rule 43(a) has continued in its original form
for sixteen years is of course some indication that it was adequate.
Many believe, however, that it is high time that extensive evidentiary
reforms be made.
22
GENERAL APPROACH OF RULE 43 (a)
It has been seen that Rule 43 (a) makes general reference to three
bodies of law,23 and provides that, if evidence would be admissible
under any one of these three systems, then it is admissible. No
mention is made anywhere in 43 (a) of the exclusion of evidence;
it is phrased entirely in terms of admissibility.
Shortly after the Federal Rules were adopted, Judge Caffrey was
called upon to rule whether certain evidence which would have been
excluded by the courts of New York was admissible in a federal
court sitting in that state.2 4 After concluding that there were no
Supreme Court or second circuit cases directly in point, and that
under the case of Rouse v. Whited25 the New York courts would ex-
clude the evidence, Judge Caffrey stated:
"... Rule 43 was invoked by the Government, but it has nothing to do
with this question. Rule 43 does not deal with the law as to what testi-
mony should be excluded. It deals only with what is admissible under
the law of the United States or the law of the State in which the particular
20. It has been estimated that an attempt to deal adequately with the law
of evidence would have doubled the work of the Committee. See Green,
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VxD. L. REv. 560, 563 (1952).
21. See Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55
HARv. L. REV. 197 (1941), wherein Mr. Monte Lemann, one of the Committee
members, is quoted as follows: 'We did not want to precipitate possible
objections in Congress from lawyers who might take exception to a particular
provision and so delay the adoption of the rules."
22. See Green, supra note 21, at 225; Green, supra note 20, at 578-80; 5
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 43.02[3], 43.02[5] (2d ed. 1951); Note, 34 CORNELL
L.Q. 238, 246 (1948). The 1946 Committee Note to Rules 43 and 44 states in
part: "While consideration of a comprehensive and detailed set of rules of
evidence seems very desirable, it has not been feasible for the Committee
so far to undertake this important task. Such consideration should include
the adaptability to federal practice of all or parts of the proposed Code of
Evidence of the American Law Institute. See Armstrong, Proposed Amend-
ments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 F.R.D. 124, 137-38." (As quoted
in 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 43.01[7] (2d ed. 1951).
23. See note 3 supra, and accompanying text.
24. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 FED. RULES SERV. 43a.3, Case
1 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
25. 25 N.Y. 170 (1862).
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court sits. It is intended to liberalize admissibility of testimony, but
has nothing to do with what should be excluded. The consequence is
that the New York decisions, such as Rouse v. Whited, with respect to
what shall be excluded, do not by force of Rule 43 control the action
of this court, and the question is a perfectly open one, without any
governing authority whatsoever for the guidance of the Court."20
The writer agrees with Judge Caffrey that the Rule was designed
to liberalize the admissibility of evidence.27 With deference, however,
it is submitted that by implication the Rule has much to do with
exclusion. By speaking in terms of admissibility and not of exclusion,
the liberal approach of the Rule is of course emphasized. But what
if it is clear that the evidence in question would be excluded under
each of the three systems? May it nevertheless be. admitted in federal
court? Professor Green points out 2s that in this situation there is
nothing in Rule 43(a) which conflicts with the application of the
federal exclusionary statute.2 Since here the statute has not been
superseded by the Rule, it should be applied, and the evidence ex-
cluded. With this the writer agrees. Professor Green argues in
addition,30 however, that, where there is no federal statute in point,
the fact that both federal equity and state systems would definitely
exclude the evidence is not controlling. It is his view that here
the federal court should admit the evidence if it would be admissible
under "the soundest doctrine found in any Anglo-American juris-
diction."3' 1 He reaches this conclusion by employing the same type of
reasoning used by Judge Caffrey-the argument that Rule 43(a)
is a rule of admissibility and not of exclusion, and hence inapplicable
here. The utilization of the last sentence of Rule 8332 is then urged,
and the general attitude towards admissibility indicated by Rule
43 (a) recalled.
It appears to the writer that implicit in the language of Rule 43 (a)
is the negative implication that, unless evidence is admissible under
some one of the three systems referred to, it should be excluded by
26. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 Fnn. RULEs SERv. 43a.3,
Case I (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
27. For a study as to the extent to which Rule 43 (a) has actually achieved
a liberalization of admissibility, see Note, 46 COL. L. REV. 267 (1946). See
also the discussion in Green, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 VAND. L.
R v. 560, 572-74 (1952).
28. Green, supra note 27 at 569.
29. The Rule Making Statute, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), now substantially
embodied in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (Supp. 1953), provided that after the promul-
gation of the Rules, "all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further
force or effect."
30. Green, supra note 27 at 570-71.
31. Id. at 571. Professor Green concedes, however, that he has found no
case adopting this view, and that several cases imply that Rule 43(a)
requires that the evidence in this situation be excluded.
32. This sentence of Rule 83 provides: "In all cases not provided for by
rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules."
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the federal court. If there is no federal statute in point, and it is
clear that both of the other two systems referred to would exclude
the evidence, then again it seems to the writer that the negative
implication of the Rule is that the evidence should be excluded. The
Rule admittedly seeks liberality of admissibility, but it specifically
sets forth the three systems from which the rules of admissibility
are to be garnered. If it were intended that, in the absence of a
federal exclusionary statute, and in the absence of a rule of ad-
missibility from one or more of the three systems mentioned, the
federal court should apply "the soundest doctrine found in any Anglo-
American jurisdiction," then the Rule should not have limited its
reference to three systems.
Akin to the above problem is that presented where either the
federal equity or state system has no clear rule as to whether the
evidence in question should be admitted or excluded. Should the
federal court determine what the law of that system is or should
be? This problem is particularly acute with respect to the federal
equity system. As Dean Wigmore commented:
".... What are the rules of Evidence in Federal equity cases? Where are
we to look for those rules? On this question, there is a singular dearth
of authority."33
In elaboration of the point, Dean Wigmore quotes from Mr. Russell
Wiles with apparent approval:
"Our equity practice is supposed to be so uniform that any lawyer can
try an equity case anywhere. But on a disputed question of evidence I
have no idea what would be a citable authority. Since the Conformity
Act does not cover equity trials, a freak local rule should be given no
weight in our courts here, although it must be followed on the law side.
If the theory of uniform practice established by the Supreme Court rules
is to be followed, local authorities should be given no weight whatever.
This would seem to relegate us to the English rules of 1842, and it is my
personal view that the logic of the situation forces us in that direction.
"But no court has ever said that these rules do govern, nor has any
court ever told us what rules govern or where they can be found. For
obvious reasons, these matters are ordinarily not adjudicated; because
the Appellate Courts in equity are supposed to ignore incompetent
evidence, and they almost never say what they have considered and what
they have not. If the District Court improperly admits evidence, it is
silently ignored in the Appellate Court. If it improperly excludes evidence,
33. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6 (3d ed. 1940). Dean Wigmore recognized that
in chancery proceedings the local state rule controlled as to the "competency
of witnesses," but states that "this provision was ignored or narrowly construed
in the Federal decisions?' The Competency of Witnesses Act, embodied in 28
U.S.C. § 631 (1940), was repealed in the 1948 revision of Title 28 for the
stated reason that the subject matter is governed by Rule 43. See 5 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 43.01[3] (2d ed. 1951).
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under the equity practice the testimony is taken under the rule and
certified to as excluded. If the Appellate Court thinks this testimony
should have been received, it reads it and follows it without comment.
But in the actual handling of equity trials it is a very serious problem
to be always at sea as to what authority you can cite with any certainty
that it will be respected"
3 4
Some35 took hope in the very fact that equity had no fully inte-
grated system of evidentiary rules. Equity had been bound neither
by the Conformity Act 36 nor by the Rules of Decisions Act.37 In an
article appearing in December, 1937, Messrs. Callahan and Ferguson
stated their position as follows:
"It is not intended to present a dark picture of the operation of this
part of Rule 44 [present Rule 43]; indeed its virtue seems to lie in the fact
that it does not restrict courts to a particularized body of rules. As to gen-
eral questions of admissibility, therefore, the federal courts will have com-
plete freedom to develop their own rules. This may be somewhat of an
overstatement. The fact that certain evidence, such as flagrant hearsay
or opinion, is not admissible in any court, coupled with the judicial dis-
like for sudden change, point to the prediction that, although the federal
courts will be starting practically with a clean slate so far as rules of
admissibility are concerned, the new body of precedent will be much
the same as the old in general outline. But the rule of admissibility as
proposed by the Advisory Committee does give the courts a free hand
in applying reforms to individual rules, thus keeping them abreast of the
times. This is all that can be asked of such a general rule and it is
believed likely that the federal courts will so administer the rule that
the results will be much more satisfactory than those which might be
expected under a conformity requirement."3 8
Professor Green denied 9 that the federal courts would start with a
"clean slate," but states:
"If gaps are left by an absence of decisions in the particular jurisdiction
the federal courts can decide for themselves what the law is. Unfortun-
ately when the opportunity presents itself they do not take advantage
of it."'40
34. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6 (3d ed. 1940).
35. See Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: 2, 47 YALE L.J. 194, 197-98 (1937). But see 1 WiaMonn,
EVMENCE § 6c (3d ed. 1940), wherein Professor Wigmore says of the equity
provision in Rule 43(a), "This part of Rule 43 seems to have little prospect
of service."
36. RFv. STAT. § 914 (1878).
37. 1 STAT. 92 (1789), now substantially embodied in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652
(1950).
38. Callahan and Ferguson, supra note 35, at 197-98.
39. Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55 HARV.
L. REv. 197, 217 (1941).
40. Green, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5 V~xm. L. REV. 560, 565
(1952). In a very recent case, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Dixon, 19 FaD. RuLES
SERv. 43a.2, Case 1 (5th Cir. 1953), Judge Rives stated with respect to Rule
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APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO COMMUNICATIONS PRIVIEGED
UNDER STATE LAW
The broad general problems that have been thus far discussed
take on added meaning and emphasis when they are considered in
the restricted context of the communication privileged under state
law.
Is the privileged communication within the purview of Rule 43(a)?
The privileged communication is a peculiar thing. It means that
the legislature or the courts have seen fit to protect certain persons
from the compelled disclosure of certain communications.41 Evidence
as to a privileged communication is normally admissible if the pro-
tection afforded by the privilege is waived (or not claimed) by the
person in whose favor the privilege was created.
It seems that rules governing privileged communications would
not normally be characterized as rules of admissibility-nor, for
that matter, as rules of exclusion. If the reader will pardon the
allusion to Gertrude Stein, they are what they are-rules governing
privileged communications.. Since Rule 43 (a) speaks only in terms
of admissibility, it may be questioned whether or not rules concerning
privileged communications fall within its purview.42 It will be re-
membered that Judge Caffrey said that Rule 43 (a) deals only with
admissibility and has nothing to do with exclusion.4 3 If this type
of analysis be carried to its logical conclusion,4 then it would appear
that Rule 43 (a) has nothing to do with the privileged communica-
43(a), "As has been often noted, that rule is slanted toward admissibility
rather than toward rejection of evidence. However, if state law excludes
the evidence and no federal statute or rule admits it, then, the evidence must
be rejected. 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.), p. 1320, 43.04. The Federal
Employers' Liability Act is not such a statute of the United States as is
referred to in Rule 43 (a), for it was not the intention of that statute to govern
rules of evidence. Central Vermont Railway v. White, supra. We get no
help from the reference in Rule 43 to 'rules of evidence heretofore applied
-in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity.' As noted
by Professor Wigmore, the search for such rules will usually be in vain. 1
Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), p. 201, Sec. 6 (c) ; or as Professor Moore notes,
'Relatively few equity cases discussed points of evidence, since those cases
were generally tried without a jury.' 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.), p.
1328, 1 43.04. It has been suggested that 'federal decisions in actions at law
are precedents for determining the rules of evidence applied in equity! 55
Harvard Law Review 224 [an earlier article by Professor Green]."
41. See note 59 infra.
42. Professor Wigmore has queried: "And the whole group of privileged
topics and privileged persons,-their evidence if they could and would give
it might be admissible, but are they compellable under a Rule which says
merely that evidence 'shall be admitted'?" 1 WIGmOmR, EVIDEN E § 6c (3d ed.
1940). See also the discussion in Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under
the Federal Rules, 55 HARV. L. REv. 197, 208 et seq. (1941).
43. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 FED. RULEs SEtv. 43a.3,
Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), discussed supra.
44. For more detailed discussion of the logical ramifications of Judge
Caffrey's reasoning, see supra pp. 560-61.
19541
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tion, for certainly a rule of privilege is not a rule of admissibility
within Judge Caffrey's approach to the term. It would seem to the
writer, however, that the draftsmen of the broadly phrased Rule 43 (a)
intended that it should govern such areas. 4 Despite its possible
semantic frailties, it is believed that the Rule should be so inter-
preted. It is true that some cases have decided questions as to
privileged communications without mentioning Rule 43(a),40 but
other cases have specifically cited it as controlling.
47
Does Rule 43(a) govern the extent of the "privilege" referred to in
Rules 26, 34, and 36?
Rule 26 (Depositions Pending Action) provides in part:
48
"Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30 (b)49 or
(d) 50 the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved.... ."51
And Rule 34 (Discovery and Production of Documents and Things for
Inspection, Copying, or Photographing) provides inter alia:
"Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice
to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30 (b), the court
in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of
the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged...
(italics added)
Similar protection of things privileged is given in Rule 36 (Admission
of Facts and of Genuineness of Documents) .52 What interpretation
45. See the discussion in Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the
Federal Rules, 55 HARv. L. REv. 197, 208 et seq. (1941).
46. See note 57 infra.
47. See for example: -United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276 (6th Cir.
1952); Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765 (D. Neb. 1953); Rediker v. War-
field, 11 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium
Co., 74 F. Supp. 907 (W.D.N.Y. 1947).
Professor Moore treats privileges as governed by Rule 43(a). 5 MOOnE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE fi 43.07 (2d ed. 1951). See also the discussion in Green,
supra note 45, at 208 et seq., and Note 34 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 243 (1948).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
49. The provision referred to bears the subtitle "Orders for the Protection
of Parties and Deponents."
50. The provision referred to bears the subtitle "Motion to Terminate or
Limit Examination."
51. Italics added.
52. Rule 36(a) provides in part: "Each of the matters of which an admis-
sion is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated
in the request, not less than 10 days after service thereof or within such shorter
or longer time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to
whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission
either (1) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which an
[ VOL. 7
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is to be given here to the word "privileged"? Do the Rules refer to
matter which is privileged under state law? Or do they refer to
matter privileged under federal law? If the latter be the case, are
federal statutes or federal decisions the controlling factor? . . . If
federal decisions, then those at law or those in equity? . . .Or is
the word "privileged" to be interpreted as a reference forward to
Rule 43 (a) ?
It has been seen53 that, although the matter is not without difficulty
and doubt, the privileged communication is probably included within
the purview of the broadly phrased Rule 43 (a). If this be correct, and
the cases and authorities seem to indicate that it is,54 then it would
appear that the word "privileged" as used in Rules 26, 34, and 36
should be interpreted to mean that which is privileged under a
proper application of Rule 43 (a).5 Such questions as this are not
much discussed in the cases, but several have definitely indicated
that Rule 43 (a) controls.56 Many cases, however, do not mention the
admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully admit or deny those matters or (2) written objections on the ground
that some or all of the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant or
that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in part, together with
a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable time." (Italics
added). See also Rule 35 discussed in note 55 infra.
53. See supra pp. 563-64.
54. Ibid.
55. Otherwise, matter might be deemed privileged in a deposition and
discovery proceeding, but not privileged upon the trial of the case--or vice
versa. That such a situation was intended seems remote.
Rule 35(b) (2) (Physical and Mental Examination of Persons) provides
in part: "By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered
or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any
privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same con-
troversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined
or may thereafter examine hirr in respect of the same mental or physical
condition." (Italics added). This provision does not create a privilege; it merely
provides that certain conduct will constitute a waiver of any privilege that
might otherwise exist. To this extent it may be considered a federal rule
of admissibility, and thus be controlling under the first system of law referred
to in Rule 43 (a).
56. In Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907, 908
(W.D.N.Y. 1947), on a motion under Rule 30(b) to limit examination, the
court stated, "Privileged communications are controlled principally by state
statutes which, under Rule 43 (a), clearly govern."
In Rediker v. Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), a case in-
volving written interrogatories under Rule 33, the court stated that Rule
33 is circumscribed by Rule 26(b), and went on to say, "Since attorney and
client relationship did not exist between the attorneys representing their
respective clients, the conversations and communications are not privileged.
Section 353 of the New York Civil Practice Act, which is applicable under
Rule 43 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that an attorney
may not 'disclose a communication, made by his client to him.'"
In Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), Judge Leibell
stated, "The word 'privileged' as used in Rule 26 (b) relating to depositions
and in Rule 34 dealing with discovery and production of documents etc. should
be interpreted as it is in the law of evidence. 'Privilege is determined by the
rules of evidence applicable to the trial of an action.' Moore on Federal Prac-




problem.57 In Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court discussed the
attorney-client privilege with respect to the problem without citing
either state law or Federal Rule 43 (a). The Court stated:
'We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental impressions
in issue in this case fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege
and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis. It is unneces-
sary here to delineate the content and scope of that privilege as recog-
nized in the federal courts. For present purposes, it suffices to note that
the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which
an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in antici-
pation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the memoranda,
briefs, communications and other writings prepared by counsel for his
own use in prosecuting his client's case; and it is equally unrelated to
writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions or legal theories."58
Is it desirable for a communication privileged under state law to be
similarly protected in a federal court sitting in that state?
A privilege is a device by which the sanctity of certain relation-
ships is protected and fostered. The creation of a privilege and the
determination of its scope involve a balancing process: 9 Will the
protection afforded by the privilege be of greater benefit to society
than the harm that would result from its consequent limitation
upon the power of the court to ascertain relevant facts? The determi-
nation of this question involves an evaluation of values, a problem
of policy. Certain communications may be privileged in one state and
not in another, for the policy determinations may be different.
See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.22 (2d ed. 1950).
57. See for example: Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 Sup. Ct. 385,
91 L. Ed. 451 (1947); Fraser v. United States (two cases), 145 F.2d 139 (6th
Cir. 1944); Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943); Ex parte
Sparrow, 18 FED. RULES SErv. 26b.43, Case 1 (N.D. Ala. 1953); Mills Music,
Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 18 FED. RULES SERV. 26b.41, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Alter, 106 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. Pa. 1952);
Holbert v. Chase, 12 F.R.D. 171 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Salamon v. Indemnity Ins.
Co. of North America, 10 F.R.D. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Reeves v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 8 F.R.D. 616 (D. Del. 1949); Matthies v. Peter F. Connolly Co., 2 F.R.D.
277 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Munzer v. Swedish American Line, 35 F. Supp. 493
(S.D.N.Y. 1940); Bough v. Lee, 29 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
58. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947).
59. Professor Wigmore has stated: "Looking back upon the principle of
Privilege, as an exception to the general liability of every person to give
testimony upon all facts inquired of in a court of justice, and keeping in
view that preponderance of extrinsic policy which alone can justify the
recognition of any such exception . . .four fundamental conditions may be
predicated as necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the
disclosure of communications between persons standing in a given relation:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) The
relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered; and (4) The injury that would inure to the relation
by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 8 WIGMORE, EVmENC E
§ 2285 (3d ed. 1940).
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If the state wherein a federal court is sitting would treat a partic-
ular communication as privileged, should the federal court likewise
protect it? From the standpoint of desirability, it would seem that
it should.60 The following relationships are the ones most frequently
protected by the states: attorney-client, husband-wife, priest-penitent,
and doctor-patient. The extent to which this type of relationship should
be protected would seem generally to be much more closely related
to state interest than federal. In most instances the communication
in question will have been made within the state wherein the federal
court is sitting. It is of course questionable whether or not the rules
of privilege have much effect upon the extent to which individuals
in these situations freely communicate. But to the extent that they
do, it would seem that the communications are normally made in
the light of state law. If a-man knows that what a patient says to
his physician in his professional capacity will be protected from
disclosure in state court, and is thus induced to tell all to his doctor,
then it would seem most unjust for a federal court sitting in that
state to refuse to afford the same protection to the communication
that the state court would have granted. For these reasons it seems
desirable for federal courts to apply state rules of privilege to
this type of communication.
There are areas, however, where federal courts should be controlled
only by federal rules of privilege-as, for example, communications
between federal officials concerning pending international negotia-
tions."' And here the state courts themselves should apply the
federal rule, for obviously the matter is peculiarly within the
federal sphere.
The foregoing discussion is not an argument that federal courts
are obliged by the Constitution to apply state rules of privilege in
the designated area. But it is believed that the suggested approach
is in keeping with the spirit of our federal system. Let us discuss
briefly whether Erie R.R. v. Tompkins62 obliges federal courts to apply
state rules of privilege in cases falling within its purview.
Do communications privileged under state law fall within the ambit
of the Erie doctrine? 63
Rules of privilege may have great effect upon the outcome of partic-
ular litigation; they may effectively prevent a party from proving
60. But see Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: 2, 47 YALE L.J. 194, 210 (1937).
61. See 8 WGMoRE, EWDENCE §§ 2378, 2379, (3d ed. 1940).
62. 304 U.S. 64, 80, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). In this case the
Court stated that, in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1,
10 L. Ed. 865 (U.S. 1842), the federal courts had invaded the rights reserved
to the states by the Constitution.
63. For an excellent discussion of the meaning and application of the Erie
doctrine, see MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 0.03 (45) (1949).
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his case. It is possible to argue, therefore, that rules of privilege fall
within the ambit of the Erie doctrine. In Reeves v. Pennsylvania
R.R.,61 plaintiff counsel had conceded for the purposes of the motion
that state law governed, and the court so assumed. There is language
in the opinion 5 which might indicate that the court believed that the
Erie doctrine controlled. In Ex parte Sparrow,0 however, the court
definitely took the position that rules of privilege are not substantive
within the meaning of Erie.
It seems to the writer that the determination of whether or not
a witness may be compelled to disclose certain information to a
federal court is a matter properly falling within the regulatory power
of the federal system.6 7 It is submitted that the Erie doctrine does not
compel a contrary conclusion with respect to cases falling within
its purview. 8 It has been seen that the writer believes that normally
it is desirable for federal courts to honor and apply state privileges,
but this is a matter of "rathers" and not of compulsion.
What law governs?
The writer has argued above that Rule 43 (a) was intended to
govern in this area, and should be so interpreted. 9 But since 43 (a)
is phrased only in terms of admissibility, how is it to be applied with
respect to rules which are not, technically speaking, rules of admissi-
bility? The problem is fraught with difficulty. Let us consider some
of the possibilities, without attempting, however, to be exhaustive.
No federal statutes have been found which run contra to the en-
64. 8 F.R.D. 616 (D. Del. 1949), criticized in 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
43.02[4] (2d ed. 1951).
65. The court stated, "The case presents the anomalous feature that certain
applications of discovery process may be available under Hickman v. Taylor
in cases arising under the general federal jurisdiction of a district court,
and may not be available in cases arising solely by reason of diversity of
citizenship. This result is accomplished by reason of the fact that the law
of privilege as applied to communications or documents may not be uniform
in the federal jurisdiction and under the law of the several states, and the
law of the several states must be applied if Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, is applicable. For the
purpose of the present motion the relevancy of Erie v. Tompkins and the
consequent application of the Delaware law of privilege is conceded and
assumed." Id. at 619.
66. 18 FED. RULES SERv. 26b.43, Case 1 (N.D. Ala. 1953); see also Fraser v.
United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944).
67. See the discussion supra, as to the power of the Court to promulgate
Rule 43(a), and see also Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91, 51 Sup.
Ct. 51, 75 L. Ed. 857 (1931), and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 61
Sup. Ct. 422, 85 L. Ed. 479 (1941).
68. See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.23[9] (2d ed. 1950).
For a general discussion of Rule 43 (a) and the Erie doctrine, see Note,
Erie v. Tompkins and Evidentiary Matters, 7 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Rnv. 1 (1951);
and Note, Evidence: Effect of Erie Railway Co. vs. Tompkins on the Admissi-
bility of Evidence and the Competency of Witnesses in Federal Courts, 31
MARQ. L. REV. 167 (1947).
69. See supra pp. 000.
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forcement of state created privileges, and thus the utility of the first
system referred to in Rule 43 (a) is practically nil.70 But what of
the federal equity system?
If it can be said that equity actually had an ascertainable practice
in this regard, then it may well be argued that under Rule 43 (a) the
court is directed to apply in each instance that rule in either system
with respect to privileged communications which would deny the
availability of a privilege. This would be in keeping with the spirit
of liberality of admissibility implicit in the Rule.7 1
What was equity practice with respect to privileged communica-
tions? Professor Moore takes the position 72 that state statutes on
privilege were followed under the prior federal equity practice, but
Professor Green states that, "this is, to say the least, a doubtful
premise."73 The latter authority suggests instead 74 that federal equity
followed state statutes on privilege only where they denied a privi-
lege, and not where they granted one. Needless to say, it is exceedingly
difficult to ascertain what was equity practice on this point. If federal
equity actually would have applied state rules of privilege, then
there is little difficulty, for then the federal courts under Rule 43 (a)
should likewise normally apply them.
If it is impossible to ascertain federal equity practice on this point,
then we are thrown back to the problem of whether or not the
federal courts are free to determine an appropriate rule.7 5 It would
seem to the writer that it is desirable for federal courts to apply
state rules of privilege with respect to relationships which are more
closely related to state than federal interests.76 It is suggested there-
fore that it is seldom if ever in this area that the federal courts should
take it unto themselves to mould different rules of privilege.
The decisions dealing with the communication privileged under
state law are utterly confused, and the writer has not found within
them the seeds of predictability. Some cases 77 say that state rules of
70. See note 30 supra. With respect to federal statutes providing for the
admissibility of evidence, Professor Moore states: "Here the practitioner
will receive little aid except from the statutes prescribing how proof of
public records may be made, and the federal 'shop-book' statute, 28 USC
§ 1732." 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 43.04 (2d ed. 1951).
71. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 43.02[3] (2d ed. 1951).
72. Id. 1 43.07.
73. Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55 IH-ARv.
L. R v. 197, 208 (1941).
74. Id. at 208-09.
75. See discussion supra pp. 561-62.
76. See discussion supra pp. 566-67.
77. See e.g.: Munzer v. Swedish American Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y.
1940), and the several cases therein cited.
In a very recent case, Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765, 772 (D. Neb.
1953), Judge Donohoe stated, "A fair interpretation of Rule 43(a), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., insofar as it relates to the admissi-
bility of privileged communications between persons involved in a confidential
ielationship is this: a state statute, if there is one, should control though it
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privilege control; others78 deny this. The famed Hickman v. Taylor
relied exclusively upon its own reasoning. Some cases79 cite Rule
43 (a); others8° do not mention it. This may be a confusing analysis;
it is certainly an analysis of confusion.
is more restrictive than federal precedents, but if there is no state statute
and the Rule is doubtful as to the particular situation, the more liberal federal
precedents may be followed. 8 Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure (3rd Ed.)
§ 26.31, p. 44; 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2nd Ed.) % 43.07, p. 1332; since
there is, in this jurisdiction a state statute on the point, this court will adhere
to it." Despite its theoretical difficulties, Judge Donohoe's approach has much
to commend it.
See also Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907, 908
(W.D.N.Y. 1947), wherein the court stated, "Privileged communications are
controlled principally by state statutes which, under Rule 43(a), clearly
govern."
78. See for example: United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276 (6th Cir.
1952); and Ex parte Sparrow, 18 FED. RULES SERv. 26b.43, Case 1 (N.D. Ala.
1953). See also Fraser v. United States (two cases), 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir.
1944). After reviewing the Tennessee law on the subject and concluding that
under its decisions the husband-wife privilege did not "necessarily extend to
those communications and acts which are in furtherance of a fraud, particularly
when the purpose of the fraud includes depriving the government of oppor-
tunity to collect lawfully imposed revenue or statutory penalties," the court
stated, "So much for the law of Tennessee. The case, however, arises in a
federal court of equity jurisdiction, and the problem presently discussed
involves remedial rights as distinguished from substantive rights, and
equitable powers which, having their source in the Constitution, were
conferred upon the courts of the United States by § 11 of the Judiciary
Act, 1 Stat. 78, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41. So we have recently been reminded in York
v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 2 Cir., 143 F.2d 503, 523, that the Supreme
Court in Kirby v. Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co., 120 U.S. 130, 7 S. Ct. 430, 30 L.
Ed. 569, declared, 'the equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
cannot be impaired by the laws of the respective states in which they sit.'
This judgment, in both of the cited cases, involved state statutes of limitation.
If, however, the rationalization in the York case, supra, supported as it is by
copious annotation, is sound, and the rule of the Kirby case prevails, not-
withstanding Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed.
1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, we must conclude that a federal equity court is not
necessarily bound to apply a state statute giving added breadth to an
evidentiary rule of privilege, when clearly it is inequitable to do so." Id. at 144.
79. See note 47 supra.
80. See note 57 supra.
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